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Spatial Mismatch: Understanding Differences in Income Mobility Between Cities 
 
Introduction 
A child born into the bottom quintile of income in Atlanta, Georgia is almost three times less likely to 
advance to the top quintile than his or her contemporary in San Jose, California. (Chetty et. al., 2014)  
While we often use simple heuristics to understand class in America – urban verses rural, Southern versus 
Northern – facts like this show that there are stark differences in socioeconomic opportunity even 
between superficially similar, “thriving” cities. This is due in large part to the lasting effects of urban 
planning decisions, which shape not only the physical form of the city but also its accessibility to the 
working poor. 
One particularly important aspect of urban planning is the provision of public transportation. For many 
low-income individuals, faced daily with the challenges of securing a reliable commute and searching for 
work, economic mobility is necessarily tied to physical mobility through the city. An equitable, extensive 
public transit network can alleviate the many costs that the working poor face in this regard. Additionally, 
public transit can guide the spatial growth of cities, countering the highway-led urban sprawl that many 
US cities have faced. 
For this and many other reasons, the accessibility of public transit is an important determinant of 
economic mobility in large cities. In this paper, I present a rigorous national test of the effect of public 
transit accessibility on upward income mobility. Before that, however, I make a conceptual case for the 
importance of public transit to studies of structural poverty. Finally, I conclude with some policy 
implications that follow from my study. My goal is to situate urban planning – and public transit 
provision in particular – within the broader context of a national conversation about economic inequality.  
 
The Idea of Income Mobility 
Inequality, broadly defined, has been a topic of great concern in recent American political discourse.  
Inequality scholars like Thomas Piketty - whose 2007 study of the US with Emmanuel Saez and 
subsequent book Capital in the Twenty-First Century both garnered considerable media attention - have 
seen their work elevated from public obscurity to a major political talking point over the last several 
years. This echoes a conceptual shift among American economists, who have historically downplayed or 
chosen not to study distributional issues - a stance against which many high-profile scholars have begun 
to break rank with the discipline.  
It is in this fraught environment that Raj Chetty, Emmanuel Saez, Nathaniel Hendren, and Patrick Kline 
published their “Equality of Opportunity Project” papers, which provided the impetus for this study, in 
2013. The Project comprises two papers, one of which addresses geographic differences in 
intergenerational income mobility across the United States, the other of which addresses long-term 
historical trends. 
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Income mobility, as a concept distinct from static equality, is of particular relevance to the US political 
conversation. Defenders of the US’s uniquely skewed income distribution have often cited the wealth of 
opportunity available to its citizens as justification for its degree of income inequality. (e.g. Mankiw, 
2013) In fact this supposed tradeoff is illusory – Alan Krueger (2012)’s famous “Great Gatsby curve” 
demonstrates that there is a strong positive correlation between equality and mobility – but it remains a 
potent rhetorical idea. That is why the Equality of Opportunity Project, which revealed vast disparities in 
income mobility within the US, struck a popular chord – it has been featured in the New York Times and 
cited by many city and state government leaders as a cause for concern. (ex. Reed, 2013) 
Among Chetty et. al.’s most striking findings is a huge difference in mobility between the South and the 
rest of the nation: on average, individuals born into the bottom quartile of income in the southeastern 
states have only a 27%-38% chance of reaching a higher income level than their parents, a measure 
among the lowest in the nation. (Chetty et. al. refer to this statistic as “absolute upward mobility”, and I 
will henceforth do the same.) 
Equally striking and less intuitive to a casual observer is the degree of heterogeneity between cities: 
among the 50 largest metropolitan areas, absolute upward mobility varies from 46.2% in Salt Lake City, 
Utah to 35.8% in Charlotte, North Carolina. Urban differences do not map neatly onto a North/South 
divide, either – among the 10 least mobile cities are 3 in Ohio, one in Indiana, and one in Wisconsin. It is 
these sorts of differences which this paper seeks to explain. 
After a brief survey of the literature on American income mobility that has preceded Chetty et. al., I will 
compare and contrast the prevailing explanations for disparities in income mobility found in the social 
sciences – particularly, the “individualist” explanations common in economics verses the “structuralist” 
arguments predominant in sociology. Then I will make a case for why geographic explanations of 
mobility – and access to transportation in particular – are a significant and relatively underexplored area 
of research. Finally, I will review some of the literature on how cities develop spatially, and how these 
conceptual frameworks – political and economic – can be applied to my case study of transit access in 
Columbus, Ohio. 
Literature Review 
Measuring Mobility 
While Chetty et. al.’s study attracted popular attention, it was hardly the first of its kind, nor was it unique 
in its broad findings. Most contemporaneous is Graham and Sharkey (2013), which gathered survey 
measures of income from a selection of American cities and regressed log child income against log parent 
income to establish a measure of intergenerational mobility. This statistic is known as intergenerational 
elasticity, or IGE. This methodology has issues, however, as the relationship between parent and child 
income is non-linear, particularly around the upper and lower extremes of income, and thus varies with 
the local income distribution. Furthermore, Graham and Sharkey’s findings are naturally limited by their 
lower sample size. In spite of these issues, their findings are broadly consistent with Chetty et. al.  
Likewise, Aaronson and Mazumder (2008) and Justman and Krush (2013) find national estimates of 
income mobility comparable to Chetty et. al., in spite of some methodological differences. Chetty et. al. 
builds on these studies  not only by offering a more detailed geographic picture of mobility, but by 
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improving on IGE as a metric. Instead of regressing log child income against log parent income, Chetty 
et. al. uses children and parents’ relative income ranks within their respective birth cohorts in their 
regression specification. This yields linear, robust results, which is why I have chosen Chetty et. al. as my 
primary dataset for this paper. 
A final note on measuring mobility: Chetty et. al. calculate two statistics based off  their regression data. 
One is “absolute upward mobility”, as described earlier, and the other is “relative mobility”, which is the 
difference between outcomes of children in the top vs. bottom income levels of their cohort. The choice 
between these two statistics has both practical and normative implications, which will be discussed in the 
methodology section of this paper. 
The Nature of Opportunity 
If there is relative consensus on the level of income mobility in the United States, its determinants remain 
a much more complex and contentious subject. Factors as wide-ranging as school quality, neighborhood 
demographics, residential segregation, local cost of living and welfare policy have all been linked to 
mobility in some way. While I am narrowly concerned with the effects of spatial isolation (particularly 
lack of access to public transportation) on mobility in this paper, it is worth discussing the broader 
intellectual currents on the topic in order to justify my particular area of study. 
Explanations of income mobility can be divided, broadly, into two camps: Individualist and structuralist. 
Individualist explanations predominate in economics, particularly in neoclassical economics and its 
modern methodological successors. When considering the determinants of income, neoclassical 
economists tend to emphasize “human capital” factors like skills and professional training, as well as 
individuals’ incentives or disincentives to work. This focus on personal qualities in isolation comes from 
neoclassical economics’ grounding in marginalist theory, in which wages are a function of individual 
workers’ productivity. This has led many scholars of the American economy to posit a “skills mismatch” 
as the cause of intergenerational poverty (ex. Handel, 2005), citing that traditional manual labor-heavy 
jobs have been increasingly obsolete by globalization and deindustrialization, and arguing that better 
training for workers (present and future) is the key to ending persistent inequality of opportunity.  
However, many scholars of poverty outside of the discipline of economics argue that economists’ focus 
on methodological individualism elides important differences social, geographic, and political contexts 
that affect income. These so-called structuralists argue that economics presupposes a fixed set of 
background conditions in these areas that bear little resemblance to reality. Structuralist arguments are 
more common in sociology and political science – in the US, the “Chicago school” of urban sociology in 
particular has produced a number of influential strucutralist scholars of poverty.  
Chief among these scholars is William Julius Wilson, whose work at University of Chicago in the 70s 
helped make its sociology department a metonym for the urban studies discipline. In The Truly 
Disadvantaged, one of his many books on the persistence of black poverty and neighborhood segregation, 
Wilson popularized the term “spatial mismatch” to characterize how many urban black communities are 
separated from work by geographic and social distance, not just a lack of professional skills. Throughout 
his work, Wilson refers to the mid-century emergence of a predominately black urban “underclass” 
created through systematic discrimination in housing policy and lending practices. This paper and many 
of the works cited therein owe a great deal to Wilson’s articulation of these problems. 
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Many scholars have followed Wilson in exploring the spatial concentration of poverty and the physical 
separation of low-income individuals from employers. For instance, Kenneth Jackson’s 1985 book 
Crabgrass Frontier provides a historical overview of the suburbanization of the American middle class 
and the coincident segregation of its black poor. Jackson argues that the United States is unique among 
developed nations in its sprawling metropolitan areas, the geographic distance between its poor and 
affluent neighborhoods, and its focus on private automobiles in transportation development – all products 
of public policy which can affect upward mobility. 
Jackson’s work deals mainly in historical narrative, but his claims have been reinforced through 
systematic studies. For instance, Jargowsky and Yang (2006) found that metropolitan areas that 
experienced a greater degree of suburbanization between the years 1990 and 2000 had a more persistent 
level of economic segregation. Similarly, Kasarda (1993) found that spatial concentration of poverty 
became greater from 1970 to 1990 on the national average, despite gains in a few Northeastern cities.  
Likewise, Baum-Snow (2010) finds that there has been a population shift from cities to suburbs since the 
1960s. However, he also observes that employment concentration is now greater in central cities than in 
the suburbs – in other words, the amount of jobs available in central cities has proportionately increased. 
Combining these two statistics, it becomes clear that fewer people today live and work in central cities, 
even as those areas become more productive.  This suggests that the ability to commute long distances is 
becoming more important for workers, exacerbating spatial mismatch for those who neither have access 
to public transportation nor a reliable car. 
Studies like this show that urban poverty can no longer be understood as a purely inner-city phenomenon, 
as in Wilson’s time – Murphy (2007) points out that since the 90s, Census data has revealed an increase 
in suburban poverty, particularly in “inner-ring” suburbs proximate to cities. She points out that the 
phenomenon of suburban poverty has been largely overlooked by ethnographic and demographic studies, 
and stresses its importance to future poverty research.  
While the nature of poverty may be shifting in some places, these papers all suggest that the social 
geography of cities – in particular, the concentration and separation of their poor – has a profound effect 
on job access and thus income mobility. In this area, there remains a disjuncture between economics and 
the rest of the social sciences. However, studies like Chetty et. al. have the potential to bridge this gap, as 
they allow social scientists to systematically test the claims made by sociologists and political scientists 
with a level of rigor and detail never before available.  
Why Location Matters 
If structuralist theories offer a compelling explanation of persistent poverty, the logical next question is: 
What sort of structures? What qualities common to cities like Columbus and Atlanta make them 
particularly inhospitable to the job-seeking poor?  
There are a number of reasons why geographic location could affect income mobility. Most common in 
the literature are “neighborhood effects” like school quality, crime rates, prevalence of single parents, and 
a lack of supportive community institutions (a dearth of “social capital”, to use Robert Putnam’s term). 
Chetty et. al. find that all of these factors explain a significant portion of difference in income mobility. A 
similar but more qualitative explanation, popularized by Wilson in When Work Disappears¸ is that youth 
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in low-income neighborhoods suffer from a lack of positive social roles to which they can aspire, and are 
not socialized into the “soft skills” of communication and professionalism necessary for working life. 
It is not my intent in this paper to judge the importance of these factors, which have been written about 
extensively. Instead, I am concerned with an explanation that Chetty et. al. do not rigorously test in their 
analysis: The physical separation from work caused by lack of access to reliable transportation. 
To highlight why the omission of this factor is critical, consider the empirical literature on the spatial 
mismatch hypothesis, which is often ambiguous or conflicting. Hellerstein et. al. (2009) provide a good 
summary of the controversy: It is difficult to parse out the effect of spatial mismatch from the effects of 
hiring discrimination. As low-income urban communities in the US tend to be disproportionately black, 
these two phenomena are easily conflated. Many statistical strategies have been used to isolate the effect 
of spatial mismatch, but Hellerstein et. al. take a different approach: They stratify their sample by race 
before testing the spatial mismatch hypothesis. They find that the issue is not a simple lack of nearby jobs 
in low-income black communities; rather, it is that these jobs tend to be disproportionately held by 
whites, even when controlling for skill levels. When the sample is restricted to black respondents, the 
conventional spatial mismatch hypothesis appears to hold. This suggests a picture of racial inequality 
more complex than spatial mismatch or hiring discrimination alone – instead, the latter plays into the 
former. 
This knowledge can help explain why place-based policy interventions like the Moving to Opportunity 
study (Katz et. al., 2001) and enterprise zones (Peters and Fisher, 2002) have appeared to have muted or 
nonexistent effects - while spatial mismatch may be a real phenomenon, it cannot be understood outside 
of larger patterns of discrimination. Looking at access to public transit is enlightening, then, as it is not 
only a determinant of social mobility in its own right but also a symptom of racial discrimination in urban 
planning and private development.        
There are many mechanisms through which public transit accessibility can affect income mobility - it 
matters for more than just commutes. Harrison and Hill (1979) find that low-skilled “secondary sector” 
jobs tend to be considerably more cyclical than high-skilled “primary sector” jobs and subject to higher 
turnover. For this reason, low-income individuals (employed predominately in the secondary sector) face 
greater and more frequent search costs from looking for work, and these costs could be exacerbated 
through lack of access to reliable transportation. As they write, “Institutional obstacles to the free 
movement of workers from the secondary to the primary labor market seem to be deeply ingrained in 
American economic life.” 
Most of the empirical work on how public transit affects work access has been through case studies of 
particular cities rather than national surveys. For instance, Gao and Johnson (2009) use an econometric 
model of travel demand in Sacramento, California to estimate the potential welfare gains from expanding 
car ownership and making public transit more efficient. They find that while both interventions would 
increase low-income residents’ welfare, public transit improvement would have broader benefits in terms 
of job accessibility and utility gains. Key to Gao and Johnston’s findings is the fact that Sacramento’s 
public transit system services both low-income and job-rich, high-income neighborhoods; this equitable 
access is a critical variable in my study. 
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Similarly, Sanchez (1999) compares the public transit systems of Portland and Atlanta and estimates the 
effect of transit accessibility on employment for both cities. Portland and Atlanta are interesting cases for 
the purposes of my study, as they not only lie on opposite ends of the income mobility spectrum, but have 
very different urban forms, political arrangements and racial compositions. Sanchez uses census block 
groups as his unit of analysis, and regresses unemployment statistics for each block on multiple measures 
of transit accessibility, as well as standard demographic covariates like racial composition and percentage 
of single parents. Sanchez includes three measures of transit accessibility: Service frequency, walking 
distance to the nearest transit stop, and a more sophisticated “gravity-based” measure of accessibility, in 
which a block is scored on its average distance from other blocks with service-sector employers, 
exponentially weighted. (The relative merits of these different measures, and how they might be 
synthesized, will be discussed in the methodology section.) 
Sanchez finds that in Portland, only the walking distance measure has a significant relationship with 
employment, and the size of that relationship is small. Even this significance vanishes when the sample is 
limited to majority non-white census blocks. However, in Atlanta, he finds that all of the measures of 
accessibility except service frequency have a large, significant relationship with employment. What’s 
more, he finds that bus accessibility has a much greater effect than rail accessibility in both cities, 
consistent with the majority of literature on this topic. He attributes the difference in findings between 
cities to the fact that in Portland, there is little variation in transit accessibility between census tracts (that 
is, transit access is relatively equitable), while in Atlanta there are large disparities between communities. 
As will be discussed in this study, the divergent development of public transit in these two cities can be 
explained in large part by their distinct bases of local political power. 
In contrast to the studies above, Blumenberg and Manville (2004) is a direct challenge to Wilson’s spatial 
mismatch thesis. Blumenberg and Manville are critical of the theory because they claim that it considers 
mere distance from jobs rather than accessibility of jobs – in many regions, as they test for in the paper, 
auto users face significantly shorter commutes than public transit users. They call this phenomenon 
“modal mismatch”, and cite as its cause barriers to car ownership for low-income residents, like reliability 
and asset value limitations imposed on welfare recipients. They are skeptical of the effects of public 
transit expansion on employment, and point out that the same patterns of discrimination that have lead to 
residential segregation have also lead to the systematic under-serving of low-income groups by public 
transit. These admonitions are important to keep in mind for any study of how public transit affects the 
least advantaged.    
Transit and Urban Sprawl 
Blumenberg and Manville’s paper is a reminder that transit issues should be considered in the broader 
social, economic and political context of urban development. The urban sprawl of an area, in particular, 
could have a great effect on the accessibility of jobs. There is clearly a connection between the nature of 
transportation (highway-led or public transit-led) and sprawl, but in what direction does causality run? 
Baum-Snow (2010), mentioned earlier, ties sprawl to highway-led growth. He uses the amount of planned 
highways in 1960 as an instrument to explain employment decentralization and commuting patterns in 
2000. He finds that expansion of the highway system has led to an outflow of residents from central 
cities, consistent with qualitative accounts of highway-oriented development like Jackson’s.  
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However, some economists contend that physical barriers to construction matter more than any public 
policy. For instance, Saiz (2010) finds that the amount of buildable land in an area strongly affects the 
elasticity of its housing supply. In addition, he argues that legislative constraints on housing are in fact 
endogenous to physical constraints – they are simply a means for residents to protect the rents they have 
already acquired. Most importantly for this paper, he concludes that a lack of physical constraints on 
building leads to a greater degree of urban sprawl. This suggests, contra both Baum-Snow and Avent, that 
the initial geographic endowments of a city matter more for its expansion than any public policy could.  
To untangle the direction of causality between transportation and land use, Levinson and Chen (2005) use 
a Markov chain model to study the co-evolution of highway networks and housing in the Twin Cities area 
from 1958 to 1990. They divide a map of the area into regular cells and classify each cell by its 
predominant use – employment, residential, mixed-use or agriculture –as well as its connection to the 
highway system. This yields 20 different types of cells. They then create a “transition matrix” for every 
type of cell, which estimates how likely it will be for a given type of cell to change into any other given 
type over the time period (in this case, a decade). They find that highway construction had an effect on 
the initial growth of the city, tending to make unpopulated agricultural areas into populated ones. 
However, they also find that the direction of causality is less clear for areas that are already urbanized. 
In sum, the literature from economics suggests that public policy, especially the choice between highway- 
and public transit-led growth, affects urban sprawl. This is critical for my thesis, because if differences in 
transit accessibility were a mere byproduct of geography then there would not be many interesting policy 
implications to be drawn. However, the literature shows that accessibility is very much the product of 
human decisions, and that city development is historically contingent. How particular policies have 
shaped Columbus will be discussed more in this paper.  
Understanding Urban Development Politics 
Many of the studies on urban growth discussed thus far are from economists and are mostly or entirely 
quantitative in nature, with little attempt made to describe why, for instance, some cities built more 
highways in the 1960s than others. They also do not say anything about why certain neighborhoods 
receive public transit service while adjoining ones do not. Yet clearly these differences do not exist sui 
generis; they are the product of city, state and national political forces that cannot be separated from arid 
statistics. As urban sociologist Mario Small (2012) wrote in a piece on the Moving to Opportunity study,  
“Ethnographic studies should play a central role in the process of developing hypotheses, since 
hypotheses based strictly on theoretical reflection, rather than at least some empirical 
engagement, face the risk that anthropologists have long attributed to arm-chair theories: they 
generate expectations that, after the fact, appear to be obviously misguided.”  
With that in mind, here are some leading political accounts of urban development as it relates to public 
transportation. Note that since that since this is by nature a localized issue these studies are by no means 
meant to be comprehensive; consider them instead archetypes which this paper seeks to follow. I review 
three theories that may be useful in explaining Columbus. The first is classifying cities by their 
institutional priorities and the degree of “professionalization” among their public officials. The second is 
analyzing the influential voting and lobbying constituencies that support a given issue. The third and final 
is considering the elite coalitions that back a mayoral administration.  
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In the first category, Herm Boschken’s “Social Class, Politics and Urban Markets” (2002) proposes a 
theory of how and why bias arises in public authority policy, using the transit authorities of a number of 
large cities as a test case. Boschken argues that economic cost-benefit analysis is a one-dimensional, 
unduly reductionist way of analyzing the efficacy of public policy, and proposes instead an analytic 
framework in which policies are evaluated on the basis of how they affect competing stakeholders. 
Boschken offers two axes on which to analyze public transportation policy:  “Operational” vs. “social” 
goals and “effectiveness” vs. “efficiency” goals. Broadly, the former can be understood as differences in 
strategy – building the organization’s prestige and eminence vs. serving political mandates – while the 
latter can be understood as differences in tactics – returning the maximum value to taxpayers vs. keeping 
costs to a minimum. 
Boschken finds that regional transit authorities differ greatly on which of these goals they prioritize, and 
seeks to explain why by testing a number of demographic, institutional, and geographic hypotheses. His 
analysis uncovers a number of interesting patterns: First, emphasizing social goals necessarily means 
downplaying operational goals, and vice versa. Second, he finds that the strongest predictors of an 
organization’s priorities are the degree of spatial centralization of the city and the fiscal autonomy of the 
agency. Centralized, congested cities tend to have socially effective but fiscally inefficient public transit 
policies (ex. New York City) while sprawling cities in which public transit agencies that are able to fund 
themselves (ex. Atlanta) prioritize their own solvency over serving disadvantaged populations. This 
suggests that the spatial form of cities matters to a great degree in shaping policy outcomes, and that the 
decision on the part of transit authorities to expand public transit to underserved groups rather than remain 
fiscally self-sustaining is best viewed as a political tradeoff. 
Similarly, Terry Clark (1972) analyzes the degree of centralization in the leadership structure of a number 
of cities. He finds that cities with military installations, cities with a more “professionalized” leadership 
class and cities with fewer direct elections tend to have a more centralized elite. In contrast, cities with 
greater competition between political parties have a less centralized elite. Clark also distinguishes cities 
by their locus of power, broadly delineating “business” vs. “political” cities. He finds that cities with a 
business-minded elite tend to have more “reformist”, technocratic governments.  
In the second category, Lupo, Colocord and Foweler’s Rites of Way (1971) is a comprehensive study of 
the Boston transit authority and how it was compelled to abort the construction of a highway in the late 
60s due to protests led by residents across whose neighborhoods the proposed route would have cut. 
Through an exhaustive investigation into the Boston planning commission, Lupo et. al. uncover an 
institutional bias toward auto-focused transportation development and an insulation from political 
consequences and citizen feedback within the organization. Lupo et. al. conclude that the protests only 
succeeded because they enjoyed the backing of a wide variety of socioeconomic groups (as the proposed 
route would cut through both affluent and poor neighborhoods) and organized around a clear, 
oppositional goal. 
Lupo et. al. then extend their findings in Boston to a national level, and argue that many cities face a 
similar disconnect between their municipal governments and their technically-minded planning 
organizations. They argue that no metropolitan area has a clearly articulated, agreed-upon development 
goal, and that in the absence of a strong political direction, planning commissions tend to have a bias 
toward the status quo when making decisions.  
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In the third category, Reed (1987) and Stone (1990)’s studies of development politics offer a model of 
how local power structures have influenced urban development in Atlanta that is useful for understanding 
other cities. Reed describes how the “reformist” administration of Atlanta’s first black mayor, Maynard 
Jackson, downplayed distributional issues vis-à-vis “value-neutral” city development issues like the 
construction of a new airport in order to maintain a coalition with business community leaders. “There 
lies the means through which the Jackson administration reconciled the interests of the black citizenry 
with the business elite’s development agenda,” Reed writes, “by defining the latter as the essential 
context for the fulfillment of the former.” [emphasis mine] Reed also posits that “caretaker” (reactionary) 
city movements do not need the institutional support that progressive movements do, a hypothesis 
supported by the success of “not in my backyard” protests like the one detailed in Rites of Way. 
Stone analyses Atlanta’s political structure from a comparative perspective, pointing out that Atlanta did 
not have the established city politics “machine” that many northern cities did - the first moderate mayor, 
Hartsfield, had to appeal to a broad group out of electoral necessity. The absence of machine politics had 
a dual effect – while it opened doors to black political incorporation, it also reduced the focus on class-
minded policies. Stone argues that Atlanta’s development has proceeded along technocratic lines, as the 
city has had a congruence of interests between its small but long-established black middle class and its 
white middle class. “Strategically important and co-optable black organizations and institutions were 
brought into the system of insider cooperation and negotiation,” Stone writes, “but they came in largely as 
clients of white patrons.” Stone argues that this institutional arrangement has shaped, among other things, 
the uneven development of Atlanta’s rail and bus system, MARTA. 
It should be noted that these areas of explanation span multiple levels of local government, including city 
governments, regional planning commissions and special-purpose authorities (such as transit authorities). 
This is intentional, as the delineation between these levels of government is by no means clear, and 
jurisdictional overlap is common. As Leigland (1994) points out in his study on public authorities, many 
of these special-purpose governments exist as vehicles for cities to finance spending, and can only be 
considered quasi-autonomous. What’s more, studies like Rites of Way show that even when transit 
construction decisions are made by a technocratic body, they can be influenced by community action.  
Rather than drawing a hard analytical distinction between levels of government based of their formal 
mandates, then, it is more informative to study local bases of power, as many of the sociological studies 
above do. Studies like these can be a valuable model for understanding power structures and institutional 
priorities in cities, and provide a necessary qualitative supplement to purely statistical accounts of urban 
development. 
Methodology 
Drawing from these sources and others, I posit that public transit access is a large factor in explaining 
differences in upward mobility between American cities. Furthermore, I believe that Chetty et. al.’s 
dataset allows this hypothesis to be tested in a more comprehensive and rigorous way than ever before, 
thanks to its scale, accuracy and longitudinal nature.  
Chetty et. al. do not use states or counties as their unit of analysis – instead, they use a constructed area 
called the “commuting zone”, created by Tolbert and Sizer (1996). Commuting zones (henceforth CZs) 
are meant to delineate areas by where the majority of the population works, and can be considered an 
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extension of the “standard metropolitan statistical area” methodology used by the Census Bureau to the 
entire United States, including rural areas. Tolbert and Sizer draw the boundaries of CZs by using 
hierarchical clustering analysis on Census data of individuals’ commuting patterns. CZs are uniquely 
suitable for this paper, as I am concerned with transportation, so I follow Chetty et. al.’s example and use 
them as my geographic unit of analysis. 
 As mentioned earlier, Chetty et. al do include urban sprawl, as measured by the percentage of residents in 
a CZ with a commute greater than 15 minutes, as one of their explanatory variables in a regression on 
income mobility, and find it to be significant. While this is broadly supportive of my hypothesis, I aim to 
provide a deeper analysis, as Chetty et. al.’s commute length variable does not differentiate between 
automobile and public transit, and does not measure accessibility per se. A more sophisticated measure of 
transit accessibility is needed. I find such a measure in Berube et al (2011)’s study of the transit systems 
of the 100 largest metro areas in the US, and test its ability to explain income mobility using a number of 
regression specifications.  
In addition, to supplement this study, I will present a political history of one city in particular: Columbus, 
Ohio, one of the least upwardly mobile cities in the US, and the second-largest to lack a rail network. 
[cite] While Columbus is far from representative of all the nation’s large cities, it offers an interesting 
illustration of the fraught politics of public transportation and is comparatively under-studied. I will 
conduct primary source research on the political/social/legal history of public transit in Columbus, and 
briefly compare and contrast my work with similar studies done in other cities. Like Reed in A Critique of 
Neo-Progressivism in Atlanta, I aim to provide a high-level narrative account of the issue, rather than a 
focused investigation of one incident. My goal is to supplement the quantitative portion of this paper with 
an example of how local conditions can inform policy.  
Design 
To establish a relationship between transit accessibility and income mobility, I regress Chetty et. al. 
(2014)’s measure of absolute mobility against data on transit accessibility from Berube et. al. (2011) and a 
number of relevant controls. I then test this model for robustness to regional fixed effects and different 
specifications of accessibility.  
It is clearly difficult to establish formal causality in this case - poor public transit may well be a symptom 
of economic stratification rather than a cause, or both may be the product of a third factor. What’s more, 
the mere presence of a relationship between transit accessibility and mobility does not imply that 
alleviating structural inequality in cities is simply a matter of running more buses – we can only establish 
a high-level correlation between the two indicators. 
These limitations are, I believe, inherent to comparative statistical studies, which is why I also explore the 
development of public transit in a particular city (Columbus), and the lived experience of those who use 
it. Consider the following regression a rhetorical framing device for the argument I seek to make, per 
McCloskey (1985)’s views on the goals of econometrics.  
With these caveats, I hypothesize that an increase in the accessibility of public transit (as measured 
below) will lead to an increase in upward mobility for low-income individuals, all else being equal.  
Data 
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Data on income mobility comes from Chetty et. al. (2014)’s national study of intergenerational mobility, 
as discussed earlier. Chetty et. al.’s data on parent and child income comes from dis-identified federal tax 
returns. Their measure is pre-tax, post-transfer and adjusted for cost of living using the CPI. In their paper 
on geographic differences, parents’ income is taken from 1980 to ’82, and their adult children’s income 
from ’96 to ’00. This cohort of children was around 30 years old when their income was measured – 
Chetty et. al. establish that this is a robust, stable measure of their lifetime income through adding data 
from subsequent years to their specification. 
As mentioned, Chetty et. al. construct two measures of income mobility from their tax return data – 
“relative” and “absolute” mobility. The former measures the difference in rank outcomes between 
children from bottom-income families vs. those from top-income families. This has ambiguous normative 
implications, as an increase in relative mobility – that is, a narrowing of the gap – could just as easily 
come from worsening outcomes for the rich as improving outcomes for the poor. (That said, the majority 
of difference in relative mobility between areas in Chetty’s data comes from the lower- and middle-class; 
the rich appear to uniformly well-off.) Absolute mobility, in contrast, measures the expected rank 
outcome for children born into the 25
th
 percentile of income. Given that I am concerned foremost with the 
outcomes of low-income individuals, I use absolute mobility in my specification.   
 A final note on Chetty et. al.’s methodology: In constructing their CZ-level mobility estimates (the only 
level of data I have access to), they count individuals by their area of birth, not the area they end up in as 
adults. This decision likely stems from Chetty et. al.’s methodological focus on childhood effects (like 
school quality) in explaining mobility. This seems problematic for my purposes, as public transit access is 
just as likely to have a beneficial effect on adults as children, if not more likely. Yet if an individual 
moves from the country to the city as a young adult, they will not be counted toward the city in Chetty’s 
data, leading to the potential underestimation of the effects of public transit on mobility. While this is a 
valid concern, Chetty et. al. check their data for robustness to migration by restricting their sample to non-
movers, and find a strong correlation between their baseline mobility estimate and the restricted estimate 
(despite endogenous selection of non-movers). This means, in spite of the migration issue, I am 
comfortable using Chetty et. al.’s data for my regression. 
Data on public transit accessibility comes from Berube et. al. (2011)’s study for the Brookings Institution. 
They study the transit systems of the 100 largest metropolitan areas of the United States. They construct 
three different measures of accessibility for each area – coverage, service frequency, and job access. In all 
cases, data on the extent of transit networks was taken from local transit agencies between 2009 and 2011. 
“Coverage” measures the percentage of census tracts within ¾ of a mile of a transit stop, this being 
considered a reasonable upper limit on commuters’ acceptable walking distance. “Service frequency” 
measures the average time a commuter must wait for transit service during rush hour, averaged across all 
census tracts. Finally, “job access” measures the share of jobs than can be reached within 90 minutes 
using public transit, again averaged across all census tracts. Since these three metrics measure distinct 
aspects of accessibility, I include all of them in my regression.  
For each metric, Berube et. al. provide four different versions. One is for all census tracts in the city, and 
the other three restrict the sample to low-, middle-, and high-average-income tracts, where low-income 
tracts have an average household income below 80% of the metropolitan area’s median (AMI),  middle-
income tracts are between 80% and 120% of AMI , and high-income tracts are above 120% of AMI. I am 
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primarily interested in the low-income metrics, given my focus on absolute upward mobility, but I test my 
regression for robustness to using the universal metrics instead.  
 Berube et. al use standard metropolitan statistical areas (SMSAs) as their unit of analysis, rather than CZs 
like Chetty et. al. Fortunately, the two groupings map closely to one another – For CZs that intersect 
MSAs, the correlation between CZ-level and MSA-level mobility statistics is greater than 0.9. For that 
reason, I can safely combine the two datasets. However, a few transit systems that are treated as separate 
in Berube et. al. are covered by one CZ – in these cases, I average the accessibility metrics of the systems 
together, weighted by population, before combining the dataset.  
Merged pairs and triads include Akron/Cleveland, New Haven/Bridgeport/Hartford, Ogden/Salt Lake 
City, Oxnard/Riverside/Los Angeles, Rochester/Buffalo, Stockton/San Francisco, and Worcester/Boston. 
Many of these cases are large cities paired with “satellite” communities that send more than a quarter of 
their workers to the main city (Berube et. al), so it is methodologically inconsequential for my purposes to 
merge them. After merging, n = 91. 
Control variables include the fraction of black residents, racial segregation and income segregation 
indices, the fraction of residents with a commute < 15 minutes, local government expenditure per capita, 
and median household income. These variables are all taken from Chetty et. al.’s dataset, and details on 
their sources and construction can be found in Chetty et. al.’s documentation. I also include the 
percentage of Democratic votes cast in 1980 Presidential election as a proxy for the political ideology of 
each commuting zone during the time when parent income data was measured.   
The commute time measure (meant to be a proxy for urban sprawl) is worth discussing in greater detail, 
as at first glance it may appear to measure essentially the same thing as Berube et. al.’s accessibility 
measures. However, commute time is not collinear with any of Berube et. al.’s measures, and this is 
because the two metrics are largely distinct – commute time captures both private automobile and public 
transit, and does not distinguish between local income strata as Berube et. al. does. As such, there is 
justification for including both in my regression. Berube et. al.’s accessibility measures should then 
capture the effect of access disparities (my variable of interest) after controlling for the effect of traffic 
congestion, slow rail systems, etc. That said, my results ultimately show that access disparities are 
necessarily tied to the factor of urban sprawl, as will be discussed in detail later. The two issues can never 
be fully separated empirically or theoretically. 
Specification and Results 
I estimate a regression of the form 
Relative mobility = β0 + β1Job access + β2Coverage + β3Service frequency + βX 
Where X is a vector of the control variables listed above. I test four different specifications of this model: 
With and without regional fixed effects and low-income vs. universal accessibility measures. For the 
regional fixed effects models, I code each observation by its official Census Bureau region: Northeast, 
Midwest, South, or West.  This accounts for any differences between regions that are not specified in the 
model. I use clustered standard errors for the fixed effects model due to likely autocorrelation between 
geographically proximate observations. In all models, I weight observations by population to correct for 
heteroskedasticity. Note that all models are robust to restricting the accessibility measure to only one of 
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the three variables (“jobaccess”, “coverage”, or “servfreq” alone) – multicollinearity is not an issue. The 
results are reported in the following tables. (t-scores in parenthesis) 
I. Regional FE, low-income accessibility measures: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                        * p<0.05; ** p<0.01
                                                                                                                  
                                                  N                                                    91        
                                                  R2                                                  0.66       
                                                                                                    (6.04)**     
                                                  Constant                                           41.922      
                                                                                                     (0.35)      
                                                  %Votes Democrat, 1980 presidential election        -0.018      
                                                                                                     (0.43)      
                                                  servfreqlow                                        0.022       
                                                                                                    (4.66)*      
                                                  coveragelow                                        4.209       
                                                                                                     (0.61)      
                                                  jobaccesslow                                       1.365       
                                                                                                     (1.40)      
                                                  Local gvt. expenditure PC                          0.743       
                                                                                                     (0.40)      
                                                  HH income per capita                               -0.000      
                                                                                                     (1.07)      
                                                  Fraction with commute <15min                      -11.530      
                                                                                                     (0.33)      
                                                  Income segregation                                 7.304       
                                                                                                     (1.53)      
                                                  Racial segregation index                           -5.640      
                                                                                                    (5.35)*      
                                                  %black                                            -15.480      
                                                                                                                  
                                                                                                AM, 80-82 Cohort 
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II. Simple OLS, low-income accessibility measures: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                        * p<0.05; ** p<0.01
                                                                                                                  
                                                  N                                                    91        
                                                  R2                                                  0.56       
                                                                                                    (8.08)**     
                                                  Constant                                           37.052      
                                                                                                     (0.84)      
                                                  %Votes Democrat, 1980 presidential election        0.034       
                                                                                                     (0.90)      
                                                  servfreqlow                                        0.043       
                                                                                                    (3.21)**     
                                                  coveragelow                                        6.927       
                                                                                                     (0.70)      
                                                  jobaccesslow                                       1.739       
                                                                                                     (1.01)      
                                                  Local gvt. expenditure PC                          0.442       
                                                                                                     (0.17)      
                                                  HH income per capita                               0.000       
                                                                                                     (1.54)      
                                                  Fraction with commute <15min                      -11.578      
                                                                                                     (0.44)      
                                                  Income segregation                                 7.206       
                                                                                                     (1.45)      
                                                  Racial segregation index                           -4.809      
                                                                                                    (4.15)**     
                                                  %black                                            -17.401      
                                                                                                                  
                                                                                                AM, 80-82 Cohort 
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III. Regional FE, universal accessibility measures: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                        * p<0.05; ** p<0.01
                                                                                                                  
                                                  N                                                    91        
                                                  R2                                                  0.70       
                                                                                                    (5.40)*      
                                                  Constant                                           40.701      
                                                                                                     (0.32)      
                                                  %Votes Democrat, 1980 presidential election        -0.014      
                                                                                                     (0.35)      
                                                  servfreqall                                        0.012       
                                                                                                    (3.92)*      
                                                  coverageall                                        5.680       
                                                                                                     (0.45)      
                                                  jobaccessall                                       1.491       
                                                                                                     (0.87)      
                                                  Local gvt. expenditure PC                          0.383       
                                                                                                     (0.19)      
                                                  HH income per capita                               -0.000      
                                                                                                     (0.50)      
                                                  Fraction with commute <15min                       -6.332      
                                                                                                     (0.55)      
                                                  Income segregation                                 12.824      
                                                                                                     (1.93)      
                                                  Racial segregation index                           -6.642      
                                                                                                    (5.64)*      
                                                  %black                                            -14.376      
                                                                                                                  
                                                                                                AM, 80-82 Cohort 
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IV. Simple OLS, universal accessibility measures: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                        * p<0.05; ** p<0.01
                                                                                                                  
                                                  N                                                    91        
                                                  R2                                                  0.59       
                                                                                                    (7.70)**     
                                                  Constant                                           36.470      
                                                                                                     (1.11)      
                                                  %Votes Democrat, 1980 presidential election        0.041       
                                                                                                     (0.85)      
                                                  servfreqall                                        0.035       
                                                                                                    (3.37)**     
                                                  coverageall                                        6.783       
                                                                                                     (0.66)      
                                                  jobaccessall                                       1.628       
                                                                                                     (0.23)      
                                                  Local gvt. expenditure PC                          -0.098      
                                                                                                     (0.69)      
                                                  HH income per capita                               0.000       
                                                                                                     (0.70)      
                                                  Fraction with commute <15min                       -5.305      
                                                                                                     (0.96)      
                                                  Income segregation                                 14.332      
                                                                                                     (1.60)      
                                                  Racial segregation index                           -4.979      
                                                                                                    (3.81)**     
                                                  %black                                            -15.431      
                                                                                                                  
                                                                                                AM, 80-82 Cohort 
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Interpretation 
These results are broadly supportive of my hypothesis. Across all specifications, the “coverage” measure 
of accessibility has a large positive coefficient and is significant at p>.05. This suggests that, all else 
equal, cities that provide public transit to a greater proportion of residents tend to be more socially 
mobile.  
However, there is another, less intuitive result: the “service frequency” and “job access” metrics are 
nowhere close to statistically significant, and have negligibly small coefficients. Given that all three 
variables purportedly measure accessibility, this is surprising. If anything, intuition suggests that job 
access should be more important than mere coverage; per Blumenberg and Manville (2004), the greatest 
physical barrier to employment that low-income city dwellers face would seem to be finding a way to get 
to work on time. What explains these contradictory findings?  
There are two potential explanations. First, the service frequency and job access metrics are subordinate 
to the coverage metric; that is, they are only calculated for census tracts that are already considered 
“covered” (aka within ¾ of a mile of a transit stop). This means that the majority of significant variation 
is captured by the coverage metric. To put it another way: For most people, the issue does not appear to 
be whether they can catch the bus or train to work on time - rather, it is whether they have access to 
transit at all. 
Second, the way in which Berube et. al. calculate their job access metric may skew the results. In the data 
provided, they do not differentiate between types of jobs; rather, they look at all employers within a 90 
minute commute. Given that low-skilled service-sector jobs tend to be in the suburbs (cf. Jackson (1985), 
Kasarda (1993), Jargowsky and Yang (2006), and many others), this measure may overestimate the 
amount of attainable jobs that low-income individuals can reach via transit.  Indeed, Berube et. al. note 
this disparity in their paper: “About one-quarter of jobs in low- and middle-skill industries are accessible 
via transit within 90 minutes for the typical metropolitan commuter, compared to one-third of jobs in 
high-skill industries.” However, they do not provide detailed city-by-city data with which to test this 
explanation. This would be a fruitful area for further research. 
A final caveat in interpreting these results: Since my sample only includes cities with a transit system, 
there is likely selection bias on the dependent variable. This makes results difficult to generalize beyond 
the sample. To correct for this bias, two-stage Heckman estimation could be used, in which a probit 
model for the likelihood of a city developing a transit system is first estimated, and then the result of this 
equation is incorporated into the income mobility OLS model. This use of Heckman correction is only 
valid if an exclusion restriction for the probit model can be found– in this case, a variable that is 
correlated with developing a transit system but not with income mobility. (cf. Bushway et. al. 2007)  Use 
of historical instruments is common for this sort of problem in econometrics, ex. Baum-Snow (2010), 
which uses planned highways as an instrument for built highways, and Ananat (2011), which uses 
railroad tracks as an instrument for segregation. Unfortunately, finding such a variable for my data is 
outside the scope of this paper, but is another interesting subject for follow-up papers. Bus and commuter 
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rail networks have often developed along the path of early streetcar routes [cite], so the historical extent 
of streetcar routes may be a strong instrument in this case. There is precedent for this – Brooks (2014) 
uses streetcar networks as an instrument for modern urban sprawl. 
Note that the use of Heckman correction assumes that all cities have the potential to develop a transit 
system – in other words, that having a transit network is a latent variable. Consider the most well-known 
use of Heckman correction, wage equations, in which it is assumed that there is some “reservation wage” 
(determined by personal characteristics) below which an individual will choose not to work. Selection 
bias caused by non-workers can then be treated as a case of omitted variable bias where the omitted 
variable is the reservation wage. However, it is not clear that there is anything analogous to the 
reservation wage in my case – it is odd to think that there is some threshold value beyond which a city 
chooses to develop a transit network. A better solution may be to use traditional two-stage least squares 
with streetcar extent (or whichever historical variable I find) as an instrument for transit accessibility in 
the first stage. In either case this is a promising route for further research.  
 In summary, transit accessibility does have a large, statistically significant effect on income mobility. 
However, it appears that the key aspect of accessibility is whether or not individuals can walk to a transit 
stop, rather than frequency of service or distance from jobs. This suggests that individuals without access 
to transit either live on the outskirts of or are systematically excluded from public infrastructure. While 
this finding deserves more rigorous study, it provides a useful way of framing the second question that 
this paper seeks to explore: Why is public transit more accessible in some cities than others? In other 
words, what political factors shape the social geography of the poor?  
 Case Study: Motivation and Outline 
Columbus, Ohio is in many ways representative of the cities that prompted this study – it is among the 
least mobile urban areas in the nation, ranking 76
th
 in absolute upward mobility out of the 91 metropolitan 
areas included in my national study. It is also the most populous city in the nation to lack a light rail 
system, in spite of decades of agency- and citizen-led attempts to expand public transit. This, I will argue, 
makes Columbus an archetypical example of medium-sized cities struggling to provide adequate access to 
work, in spite of its modest ranking (63
rd
 out of 91) on Berube et. al’s transit coverage measure. (I will 
discuss the qualitative limitations of this measure below.) Moreover, Columbus has faced many of the 
common urban growth issues – sprawl, residential segregation, and jurisdictional fragmentation - that 
have plagued most cities in the region.  
Of course, like any city, Columbus also has idiosyncratic political and economic qualities – for instance, 
its historic lack of a large industrial base and its incorporation of its suburbs, both of which make it 
unique among Rust Belt cities. In the following section, I will attempt to parse out those institutional 
characteristics of Columbus that are common to other low-accessibility and low-mobility cities, and 
explain how they have shaped critical instances in the city’s development.  
 I will present these critical instances in four sections: the initial growth of Columbus in the early 20
th
 
century, its highway-led expansion into the suburbs in the 50s, the creation of the Central Ohio Transit 
Agency and the Mid-Ohio Regional Planning Commission in the 70s (and with them the bus system), and 
finally, contemporary attempts to improve public transit through initiatives like light rail. In each section, 
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I will discuss how the events can be related to the theories of urban political economy discussed in the 
literature review, and present contrasting cases when needed. 
I consider four potential explanations for the city’s underdeveloped public transit: The presence or 
absence of cilentelist politics, the extent of organized citizen protest, the priorities of local government,    
and the resources given by state and federal government. Finally, I will discuss which of these theories 
presents the most compelling explanation for the city’s underdevelopment, and what lessons can be drawn 
from Columbus’s experience. I will argue that while the development of public transit is highly path-
dependant, it can be redirected if there is broad-based popular support for better transit, few institutional 
veto points and sufficient finances on the local level.   
Early Growth and the Great Migration 
Columbus was, in many ways, a town that fell into its success. Despite its status as state capital, it 
remained a residential backwater for the majority of the 19
th
 century, distinguished only by its 
connections to the railway system (which made it an overland shipping hub) and its state and federal 
government presence (which attracted a small professional class). Unlike its neighbors to the north, like 
Cleveland, Youngstown and Detroit, it lacked any sort of manufacturing base until the 1880s, when 
nascent iron and steel industries began to emerge. (Hunker, 2000) While heavy industry in Columbus 
never achieved the takeoff growth that it did in the rest of the Rust Belt, the city’s central location, low 
wages and lack of organized labor initiatives made it a target for capital, and by the 1920s national firms 
like Ford had begun to set up shop. 
At the same time, industrial development made Columbus a common site for black workers and families 
fleeing the South in what would be retrospectively known as the Great Migration. (Bryant, 1983) Again, 
Columbus’s experience was more modest than its neighbors – its black population tripled from 1910 to 
1930, compared to Cleveland’s eightfold increase over the same period. Nonetheless, the Great Migration 
profoundly affected the city’s residential character. Citizen violence and intimidation, restrictive lending 
covenants, gerrymandering of school districts and other quasi-legal forms of segregation helped to define 
the city’s patchwork racial and economic geography, much of which persists to this day. The majority of 
black residents ended up in a handful of neighborhoods clustered around the High Street / Broad Street 
intersection in the center of the city, including Flytown, Franklinton, the Lower East Side and west of the 
Scioto River. Not coincidentally, these neighborhoods were both adjacent to factory pollution and distant 
from the city’s white professional class, which was beginning to make its way north and east. 
This white drift (which, for the time being, was confined to geographically contiguous neighborhoods) 
was aided by the city’s aggressive annexation policy. Compared to other cities in the region, Columbus 
was unusual in its degree of suburban incorporation. Since neighboring communities depended on 
Columbus for utilities like water and sewer lines, the city government could make formal incorporation a 
precondition for the provision of these services. (Hunker) This quid pro quo expansion was aided by 
Ohio’s constitutional code, which did not require the approval of a neighboring territory’s landowners for 
city annexation, provided that the proposal was initiated by the territory’s officials. While early 
annexation may seem like a legal curiosity, it had a profound effect on the city’s midcentury 
development, as will be detailed later. 
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At the end of WWII, however, these early signs of expansion were not evident – Columbus still had little 
national standing or economic clout. Owing to this, the city never developed a clientelist political 
“machine” like those which dominated many industrial cities in the 19th and early 20th centuries, including 
Cleveland, Chicago and Philadelphia. While these cities were governed by political bosses who secured 
support via a personalist system of patronage, Columbus’s leadership has always been characterized by a 
degree of professionalization. (Hunker) 
Some scholars of urban politics, like Mollenkopf (1978), argue that machine politics, while undeniably 
corrupt, led to greater public-works investment than in cities with reformist mayors and city councils. 
Mollenkopf argues that reformist governments - concerned first with modernization and economic growth 
- tended to follow the interests of the local business community, forgoing the redistributive politics of 
party bosses in favor of a technocratic policy of attracting investment.  Likewise, Clark (1972) finds that 
cities with business-friendly reformist governments tend to be more centralized and less responsive to 
citizen demands, holding fewer direct elections and spending less on public goods.  
As an example of this phenomenon, Stone (1989) argues that Atlanta’s underinvestment in and unequal 
provision of public transit is a direct result of the city’s professionalized politics. The lack of ward-based 
patronage may have afforded Atlanta’s black middle class the opportunity for political representation, he 
says, but it also required to them to do so on terms that were group-neutral and favorable to business 
investment. He quotes Andrew Young, the city’s second black mayor, as saying that he could not “govern 
without the confidence of the business community”. As a result, Atlanta’s MARTA transit system was 
built along those routes which were most financially and politically feasible, avoiding many suburban 
communities entirely despite the outward shift of employers. 
Can the “clientelism vs. reformism” lens help explain Columbus’s public transit outcomes? Looking at 
the public transit systems of other large cities, it is not clear that this explanation is generalizable. Many 
of the cities with the most accessible public transit systems, including San Francisco, Los Angeles, 
Portland and Denver, also lack a lasting tradition of ward-based patronage politics. Moreover, the basis of   
the generous clientelist city vs. spendthrift reformist city dichotomy does not appear to be historically 
sound. As Lieberman (1998) details, there was in fact a negative relationship between per capita welfare 
payments and Black population percentage for other social programs like Aid to Dependent Children, 
even in the machine cities of the North. The presence of machine politics had a positive effect on welfare 
coverage, but not on substantive outcomes. Thus, this theory does not appear to be an instructive way to 
understand the politics of public transit (which is foremost a social program) either.  
Reed and Stone’s accounts of Atlanta might help explain that city’s particular difficulties in securing 
substantive black political representation (and their arguments are much more nuanced than this 
clientelism vs. reformism story would suggest), but they cannot be applied to the whole universe of large-
city cases. In fact, Columbus’s public transit development did not take place in earnest until the 1970s, 
well after a national wave of municipal code reforms did away with the worst excesses of machine 
politics, even in places like Chicago and Philadelphia. To understand Columbus’s underdevelopment in 
public transit, we must look nearer in history, toward the era of mass suburbanization.    
A City Divided: Private Deed Restrictions and Highway Expansion 
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In the post-WWII period, Columbus would shift into the industries that would become its dominant 
economic force to this day: Banking, logistics, technical and medical research, and other highly skilled 
but ubiquitous industries. (Hunker) Paralleling this economic shift was a change in the residential 
character of the city, as the burgeoning middle- and upper-middle classes began to demand a new 
standard of living, characterized by single-family owned homes, large plots of land, and above all, 
distance from the inner city. With each successive wave of new developments, patterns of affluence in the 
city became more diffuse, as those who could afford it pulled up roots in the central city to move to 
neighborhoods like Upper Arlington, Bexley and Dublin.  
The general outlines of this phenomenon of “white flight” – endemic to nearly every large American city 
– are well documented. What is less known is that in the case of Columbus, the self-segregation of the 
suburbs was driven primarily by the actions of private developers, not by restrictionary zoning laws. 
Indeed, it can be argued that from the policymaking perspective, Columbus’s urban sprawl was not a sin 
of commission but of omission, of the acquiescence of city planners to the demands of real estate 
magnates and not -- as was the case in some (mainly Southern) cities -- the direct result of prejudiced 
policy. Regardless of its ultimate cause, the urban sprawl of Columbus had a profound effect on the city’s 
transit choices. 
Race-based restrictive covenants, which allowed landowners to deny the purchase and rental of properties 
to minorities as they saw fit, were legal in the United States until the 1948 Supreme Court decision of 
Shelley v. Kramer.  Before then, however, developers in Columbus took full advantage of the practice. 
During the first real estate boom in the 1920s, more than two thirds of new subdivisions in the city had 
explicit racial prohibitions on ownership. (Burgess, 1994) This convention was most common in the 
wealthiest neighborhoods, like Worthington and Upper Arlington, which were entirely planned 
communities. 
Restrictions on ownership were not always as nakedly prejudicial as racial covenants. More common 
were lower limits on property value and restrictions on constructing multi-family housing. While these 
types of restrictions certainly had legitimate applications, their effect on segregation by income and race 
was largely similar, perpetuating the residential divide. In fact, some restrictions were explicitly 
conceived as ways to circumvent Shelley v. Kramer – for instance, the communities planned by famous 
developer King Thompson, including Grandview and (once again) Upper Arlington, required membership 
in a “community association” as a condition of purchase. (Burgess) Prospective homebuyers had to 
receive the approval of a majority of the existing property owners – owners who, of course, tended to be 
overwhelmingly white and affluent. The result was a striking amount of continuity in the demographics of 
neighborhoods pre- and post- Shelley v. Kramer.  
What to make of the city government’s role in this process? In other cases, much has been made of the 
effect of zoning laws – rules enacted by city councils to dictate what sort of properties could be built on 
given plots of land – on de facto segregation. In Columbus, however, formal zoning laws largely followed 
the private restrictions imposed by developers, as in the case of Worthington, where the city directly 
adopted King Thompson’s codes as its own following annexation of the subdivision. In this way the 
patterns of segregation imposed by the market were enshrined in law by the end of the 1950s. Around the 
same time, discriminatory lending by the Federal Housing Discrimination hastened the racial/class 
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division of the city. The neighborhoods that were “redlined” (deemed high lending risks) by the FHA 
remain among the most black and least affluent parts of the city today. (Burgess) 
The adoption of zoning laws largely coincided with the city’s annexation of the surrounding suburbs. As 
mentioned earlier, Columbus was proactive in its incorporation of new developments, extending the 
incentive of water and electricity lines in exchange for annexation. Many communities took the city’s 
offer – in fact, some new developments were planned with the expectation that the city would soon absorb 
them. (Burgess)  
To a large extent, the construction of Columbus’s highways followed the caprice of developers as well. 
For instance, Route 315 was conceived as a way to connect Upper Arlington to the rest of the city. 
(Burgess) As Columbus’s population grew in the late 50s and early 60s, this practice extended to the 
interstate highways as well – the routes of I-70 and I-270 largely followed residential patterns in the 
surrounding counties of Fairfield, Delaware and Madison, which are predominantly commuter suburbs 
(though not part of the city proper). In effect, these interstate routes have become intracity routes, with 
deleterious effects for inner-city residents – not only do these routes further urban sprawl, but they also 
cut straight through low-income neighborhoods like Franklinton, making pedestrian travel across them 
difficult or impossible. 
Notably, Columbus’s public school system did not expand along with the city’s formal territory. Instead, 
school districts remained fragmented by neighborhood even as the inner-ring suburbs became part of the 
city proper. This unusual arrangement allowed the city to avoid the (often violent) backlash to Brown vs. 
Board of Education’s mandated school integration that visited cities like Boston in the 1970s. (Jacobs, 
1998) In Boston, Louisville, Atlanta and elsewhere, busing cut across both white and black 
neighborhoods, leading to considerable white resistance. Columbus’s civic and business leaders, fearing a 
situation like Boston’s, recognized that busing had to proceed smoothly, for the city’s sake – but their 
solution, allowing school districts to remain fragmented by community, effectively ran against the 
policy’s intent while upholding the letter of the law.  Their strategy also allowed the city to maintain its 
affluent tax base, unlike other cities where whites moved to nearby counties or townships in the wake of 
Brown v. Board. This is a key reason why Columbus never experienced any significant political or 
economic shakeups in its recent history. (Jacobs) 
The sum of all these trends – suburban annexation, highway construction and the lack of school 
integration – is that mid-century Columbus secured economic stability at the cost of greater social goals. 
The city government has made an implicit pact with developers: It will keep Columbus’s political and 
fiscal house in order in exchange for consistent, if unremarkable, economic growth.  
Yet if Columbus’s mid-century planning policy tended to follow private patterns of development, it was 
not the inevitable consequence thereof. It is true that the institutional decision-making structure of 
planning is usually unidirectional – funds flow from federal and state budgets to local agencies, which are 
free to act but are only given a narrow technical mandate. This tends to lead to projects that preserve the 
economic status quo, as in the case of Columbus. However, there are many well-documented instances of 
communities successfully campaigning against plans, especially in cases of highway building, which can 
cleave neighborhoods in two. Why were the residents of Columbus never able to mount a successful anti-
sprawl campaign? To answer this question, it is again helpful to consider a counterfactual – in this case, 
Boston in the 1960s. 
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In 1966, a broad coalition of citizen interest groups – representing everyone from planning experts to 
clergy, university faculty to real estate agents, low-income black and immigrant neighborhoods to affluent 
suburbs – would successfully campaign the Massachusetts governor to block a proposed expansion of the 
I-95 highway that would have split the city from east to west. The specifics of this campaign, 
meticulously narrated in Lupo, Colocord and Fowler’s Rites of Way, are beyond the scope of this paper, 
but it is worth looking at what Lupo et. al. identify as the key aspects that made it successful. 
First and foremost, the campaign enjoyed the support of a truly wide variety of groups, not just in terms 
of income or demographics but in terms of expertise and access. The campaign was spearheaded by a 
group of nonprofit planning consultants who were able to identify the state Department of Public Works’ 
automobile-biased methods of forecasting transit demand as an issue in the first place, and then debate it 
on its own terms. Likewise, the support of civil society organizations like churches and suburban 
community was critical, eventually leading the mayor of Boston to put his support behind the campaign 
and make it a national issue.  
Additionally, the residents of the Boston area already had a well-established alternative to highway 
expansion that they could point toward – the commuter rail system of the Massachusetts Bay Transit 
Authority. The guiding rhetoric of the campaign was that the state highway planning process failed to 
take into account the alternate modes of transit already used by the community.  
Finally, the campaign was able to make the highway expansion into a politically unavoidable issue for the 
Massachusetts governor. This is due in part to the timing of the campaign around an election year, but 
also to a concerted effort to bring highway expansion into the debate through media campaigns and 
journalistic attention. Boston has always exerted an outsize influence on the state politics of 
Massachusetts, a fact that organizers were able to exploit to their advantage. They made what was 
previously considered a technocratic issue into a political one. 
Columbus faced no such inflection point in its urban development. The expansion of its highways only 
disrupted those neighborhoods least able to mount a protest. This stands in contrast to the case of Boston, 
where the I-95 expansion threatened established, affluent communities like Cambridge. In Columbus, the 
new routes did not cut through venerable suburbs, instead running out to rural areas in the east and 
northwest that had just begun the transition away from farmland. Furthermore, there was no confluence of 
civil society groups that stood up to oppose this, no independent planning experts to point out the harm in 
its long-term implications. 
Most importantly, the timing of Columbus’s development relative to the federal push for highway 
construction could not have been less favorable to public transit. While Boston had already been 
developing its commuter rail system for several decades, Columbus had not even established a transit 
agency by the time of the first great federal investment in highways. (Hunker) 
 In sum, the modal choice of a city – the split between public transit and highways - is both politically 
contingent and highly dependent on its existing path of development. In both areas, Columbus faced a 
“perfect storm” of factors that made transit-oriented development in the mid-century infeasible.  
However, even some relatively late-blooming cities – like Portland – were able to make sprawl prevention 
and transit-led growth a successful part of their development agenda. While Columbus certainly had the 
Max Mauerman  24 
deck stacked against transit during its first period of growth, this is not a sufficient explanation for its 
contemporary transit outcomes.  
The Creation of COTA and the Revival of Columbus 
If Columbus’s small industrial economy meant that it never saw the heights of productivity – and 
attendant inequality – that its Rust Belt neighbors did in the first half of the 20th century, it also meant 
that the city was able to bear the effects of deindustrialization in the 60s and 70s more gracefully. Most 
heavy industries in Columbus did in fact wither or leave the city during the time, but this was less a 
reversal in the direction of its economy than the acceleration of an existing trend - only 30 percent of 
Columbus workers were employed in manufacturing in 1960, declining steadily to 11 percent by 2000. 
(Hunker) 
The city came to specialize further in services during this time, as nationally-known hospitals, retail 
headquarters and banks (among others) sited downtown. This growth more than offset industrial losses, 
leading some to declare Columbus “recession proof” – an assertion that would be challenged at the turn 
of the next century, but at the time seemed indisputable.  
 It was in this optimistic environment that the city decided to purchase a fleet of buses run by the 
Columbus and Southern Ohio Electric Company and found COTA, the Central Ohio Transit Authority. 
Despite its name, COTA only serves the city proper (and the townships within it), and does not run out to 
the surrounding counties. This is why, as mentioned in the introduction, Berube et. al.’s measure of 
transit coverage overestimates Columbus’s accessibility to inner-city workers – although there is 
significant economic activity in Columbus’s suburbs, they are not included in the calculation of coverage 
due to their complete lack of transit service. 
 If the entire Columbus Metropolitan Statistical Area was included in Berube et. al.’s estimation, the city 
would look much less accessible.  In fact, looking nationally, most of the difference in accessibility 
appears to come from the lack of connections between low- and high-income areas: If the sample is 
restricted to low-income census tracts alone, most cities score well on accessibility, aside from a few 
exceptionally poor cases like Atlanta. This further illustrates that like most cities, Columbus is split 
between affluent auto-reliant suburbs and a struggling transit-reliant urban core. 
To illustrate the disparities in COTA service: Only one bus runs out to the nearby affluent communities 
of Dublin and Hilliard, found to the west of Columbus proper. The same is true of equally prosperous 
Westerville and Canal Winchester to the east, and Pickerington, one of the fastest-growing (and highest-
median-income) suburbs, is not serviced at all by COTA. Boschmann (2011) demonstrates how these 
disparities affect job access in his study of the commuting patterns of the working poor in Columbus. He 
found that a majority of the respondents he surveyed had been offered or knew of better-paying service 
jobs in the surrounding suburbs, but had no practical way of getting to them. In the most dramatic cases, 
some of Boschmann’s respondents were forced to adopt “extreme commutes” of more than two hours 
one way in order to get to work on time, or relied on taxicabs at great personal expense.    
The first COTA routes followed a circuit more than century old, first traversed by streetcars in the mid-
19
th
 century. Along a path that used to connect bustling cross-street markets to residential areas in the 
north and south, a bus now served an almost entirely low-income population in the old city. (Blanchard, 
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1922) While there have been some tentative expansions into the north and east since the 70s, the main 
COTA routes of today remain the same. Nearly all of Columbus’ white-collar professional class, and 
indeed the city’s workforce as a whole, drive to work – 2011 estimates put COTA’s ridership at a mere 
2.3 percent of the metropolitan working population. (Boschmann) Comparatively speaking, Columbus 
ranks 42
nd
 on transit ridership rates out of the 50 largest metropolitan areas of the US.  
However, transit efforts did not stop with COTA. In light of Columbus’s residential sprawl and the 
increased need for inter-county coordination on infrastructure projects, the Mid-Ohio Regional Planning 
Commission was formed in 1960s, encompassing most of the counties in Columbus’s standard 
metropolitan statistical area. MORPC is responsible for allocating federal money for transit and other 
infrastructure projects. While it cannot act without a majority vote from its member governments (the 15 
county governments of the greater Columbus area), it still exerts a significant amount of influence over 
the region’s policy priorities, acting more like an autonomous quasi-governmental body than a purely 
technical agency. 
Regional bodies like MORPC often use their fiscal authority to spearhead public transit projects on their 
own, rather than waiting for a legislative mandate.  Is Columbus’s lack of accessible transit a product of 
MORPC’s institutional priorities? Boschken argues that public agencies can be understood as holding one 
of four mutually exclusive goals: Organizational effectiveness (increasing public standing and budget), 
operational efficiency (maintaining fiscal and technical stability), social-program effectiveness (serving a 
broader goal like aiding the poor) and reciprocal effectiveness (giving the best value to the biggest 
taxpayers). Boschken uses factor analysis to determine which local institutional/political/economic 
characteristics can predict an agency’s priorities.  
The sum of his results is that cities can be broadly grouped into two types: Centralized, congested cities 
with socially effective but fiscally inefficient transit systems (e.g. New York City), and sprawling cities 
with transit systems that are fiscally autonomous but do not serve a social end. He also finds that agencies 
that prioritize social effectiveness tend to come from cities with a large upper-middle class.  Boshken 
posits that this is due to the prevalence of an upper-middle-class “genre” in those cities – essentially, a set 
of technocratic norms and values that informs policymaking. He believes that holding UMC values lead 
transit agencies to focus more on social goals – as long as public transit is not in policymakers’ 
backyards.  
To the extent that Boschken does not simply reiterate the previous discussion on the importance of urban 
sprawl, his findings are worth considering. Columbus does not easily fit into his framework. For one 
thing, its transit system is certainly not fiscally autonomous – about half of its funding comes from the 
state’s general revenue fund, which is temporary and politically contingent. (Nationally, the average 
transit system receives only 25% of its operating funds from the state. (ODOT, 2015)) Moreover, under 
current law, MORPC’s federal dollars can only be allocated toward new capital projects rather than 
upkeep costs, which comprise most of the lifetime cost of transit systems. (ODOT) 
As for the upper-middle-class explanation, it is not clear how Boschken thinks that the UMC “genre” 
actually influences agency policies. Nonetheless, if we follow him in using income statistics as a proxy 
for the prevalence of the UMC, it is obvious that Columbus is not exceptional in this regard. About 20% 
of Columbus’s population is in the 4th national quintile of income – the same as the overall national 
average. This variable should not have much influence over outcomes one way or the other, then.  
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Finally, there is the question of the dependent variable in Boschken’s study - anecdotal observation 
suggests that MORPC does not suffer from a lack of institutional will (or at least desire) to expand service 
to the least advantaged. The agency constantly lobbies the state and federal governments for more flexible 
transit funding, consults community and advocacy groups when planning new projects, and is the region’s 
leading advocate for sprawl-limiting, public transit-led “smart growth” policies. As one of the few self-
described progressive groups active in local policy-making, MORPC wears its social priorities on its 
sleeve. (Personal correspondence, 2015)  
A better explanation is to look at institutional veto points within MORPC. As mentioned, MORPC only 
operates with the consent of its constituent governments; its director can propose initiatives but is 
ultimately constrained by the voting process. This can allow the parochial interests of individual counties 
and townships to prevail over agency priorities, as demonstrated by a recent controversy over a proposed 
change to the state’s local government revenue-sharing formula. A proposed amendment to Ohio’s 2016 
state budget would have allocated revenue-sharing funds away from municipalities and toward townships 
and villages. Representatives of the city of Columbus and its resident county (Franklin) expressed 
opposition to this measure in MORPC meetings, but could not get a majority of member governments to 
support them in condemning it. This is because MORPC’s “one member, one vote” rule effectively over-
represents small rural governments. A similar dynamic plays out in transport funding allocation debates 
(MORPC’s primary responsibility): outlying counties have been slow to put their support behind 
expansion projects that would provide little direct benefit to their (mainly suburban, mainly affluent) 
populations. (Personal correspondence, 2015) 
It is instructive to contrast MORPC with the Portland area's regional planning body, simply known as 
Metro. Metro's council members are democratically elected and can hold no other political appointments. 
It also has home rule authority under the Oregon state constitution, which allows it to preempt city and 
county governments in all matters of “metropolitan concern”. Furthermore, Metro's efforts to manage 
growth in the Portland region are explicitly supported by state law: Oregon's Senate Bill 100 requires all 
cities to establish an “urban growth boundary” and maintain a long-range land use plan. (Freire and Stren, 
2001) 
Notably, unlike MORPC, Metro has enjoyed relative harmony between its constituent governments. This 
is largely because both urban and neighboring rural counties in the Portland region benefit from the urban 
growth boundary – Portland is surrounded by farmland, which has historically formed a significant part of 
the state's economy. When iconoclastic governor Tom McCall led the effort to pass Senate Bill 100 in 
1973, he was able to take advantage of a confluence of interests between urban and rural representatives 
on the matter of controlling growth. (Freire and Stren) As a result of this institutional arrangement, the 
city of Portland  has had a much more activist, forward-looking development agenda than most cities in 
the US. This is possible because Metro has significantly fewer institutional veto points than MORPC. 
The institutional structure of public agencies, then, clearly has an effect on public transit outcomes. In 
order to understand the obstacles to institutional reform and stable transit funding, we must consider two 
final pieces of the policy puzzle: the state legislature and mayor’s office. A survey of recent (failed) 
efforts to expand public transit service in Columbus will be illustrative here.  
Paved With Good Intentions: Contemporary Public Transit Initiatives 
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In the last three decades, city leaders have recognized the great potential benefits of growth management 
and transit-oriented development. A number of proposals, including calls for streetcars, light rail or bus 
rapid transit, have been put forward by COTA, MORPC and the mayor’s office, but none have managed 
to gain traction. This is due to three large fiscal obstacles: the conditionality of federal funding, anemic 
state support and the lack of local revenue-raising powers. Because of these constraints, transit projects 
have had to rely on either sales tax referenda and/or private investment for funding, and both sources have 
proven unreliable. I will explore how these constraints shaped the outcome of a number of failed transit 
expansion initiatives over the last three decades.  
One of the first campaigns for transit expansion came in the early 1980s, when COTA unveiled its 
“Transit80+” plan, which promised not only improvements to the existing service but a light rail starter 
line. However, this plan not only failed to inspire public support, but would have been fiscally impossible 
– the local sales tax levy that was meant to fund it expired in ’84. (Gibson, 2015) This did not stop COTA 
from persistently lobbying for light rail in its subsequent plans, even proposing a downtown monorail in 
’87. However, these demands were made with the implicit recognition that they would not be met any 
time soon – in ’89, another levy had to be passed just to keep COTA’s existing bus service running. 
In the early ‘90s, Columbus’s opportunity to host the international AmeriFlora conference – which 
brought an unprecedented influx of visitors – prompted more calls for a light rail system, this time led by 
MORPC. The mid-‘90s plan enjoyed more public support than previous efforts, but political and business 
elites balked at the large-scale restructuring of downtown zoning that the plan – centered around what 
would instead become the Columbus Convention Center – would require. Additionally, a levy to fund the 
plan died in the planning phase in ’95, and a levy to simply increase COTA's bus service was voted down.  
(Personal correspondence, 2015) 
 A shot at redemption for rail advocates came in ’98, when the federal legislature passed an infrastructure 
bill that provided, for the first time in decades, federal funding for public transit. The plan, tied to the 
Clinton administration’s welfare reform efforts, could have funded the capital costs of a Columbus light 
rail system – however, the city lacked an active transit plan that included light rail, and so the funds went 
unclaimed. (Gibson, 2015) 
Further struggles with securing federal funding came in the early 2000s, when COTA attempted to fund 
yet another light rail project – this time dubbed the North Corridor Line – through the Federal Transit 
Administration’s New Starts capital investment program. However, the stringent conditions of New Starts 
made this project a non-starter – not only was the city unable to secure the 50% matching funds required 
by the FTA, but the North Corridor Line received middling evaluations of its justification and land-use 
feasibility, which ultimately led to its demise. 
Even a decidedly more modest attempt to create a streetcar route from the Ohio State University area to 
German Village in the late 2000s met with the same objections from the FTA and has been shelved 
indefinitely. Since then, there have been no new mass transit projects proposed for the region, save the 
ever-present idea of a Columbus to Chicago high-speed rail line, which has been in “early talks” for 
nearly two decades (and bears little relevance to the accessibility issues discussed in this paper). 
Light rail initiatives have not suffered from a lack of city government support, at least in word. The 
mayor’s office has consistently advocated for the expansion of the transit system, including it in the city’s 
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strategic plans since the early 90s. (Columbus, 1993) Indeed, incumbent mayor Michael Coleman has 
been a vocal supporter of light rail since his City Council days, when as a young advocate he argued that 
a robust transit system could make Columbus the next Toronto (Bryant, 1994) – a connected, 
cosmopolitan city. However, as the case of MORPC’s failed ‘90s light rail plan demonstrates, elite 
support for transit has been predicated on its alignment with the business community’s larger 
development priorities, and this has constrained the actions of the city administration. As MORPC’s 
proposed route directly conflicted with Mayor Lashutka’s designs for a downtown Arena District and 
convention center, it received little elite interest, and the plan was ultimately scrapped. (Gibson, 2015) 
Popular support for transit has been similarly ambivalent.  As mentioned, levies to fund the existing 
COTA bus system have received lukewarm support at best, likely due to the system’s low ridership rates - 
especially among middle-class voters. However, light rail has polled considerably better – a 2007 poll 
from Business First found that 68% of respondents supported the streetcar proposal that was in talks at 
the time, "largely based on [Mayor Coleman’s] pledge of no additional taxes to support the plan". 
Likewise, a 2014 online poll conducted by OSU found that 96% of respondents supported the creation of 
a light rail system (Gibson, 2015) – however, the poll made no qualifications about financing and, like all 
online polls, likely suffered from significant selection bias. Nonetheless, it seems like a majority of 
Columbus residents support transit improvement in principle – but response at the ballot box has been 
more conflicted.  
There has only been one local ballot initiative explicitly related to rail: A 1999 proposal for a sales tax 
increase to fund both rail and bus expansion. This initiative was split into two parts, one permanent and 
one temporary, and only the permanent levy passed. State development officials suggest the complexity 
of the two-part ballot question like contributed to this ambiguous result, and note that there has never 
been an outright defeat of light rail at the polls. (Personal correspondence, 2015) In sum, while there has 
never been an overwhelming popular mandate for public transit expansion, the public seems on balance to 
support it, especially when it promises to bring investment to outlying communities, as is the case with 
light rail. 
In the absence of a strong public mandate one way or the other, what can explain the consistent failure of 
Columbus’s public transit initiatives? Here, Reed and Stone’s analyses of progressive reform politics in 
Atlanta may offer a guide. If Columbus’s economic stratification was driven by racial animus, Atlanta 
faced a set of segregationist pressures many times stronger, and yet has boasted an unparalleled level of 
black political incorporation - even without the crutch of machine politics. Stone argues that this was only 
possible due to a congruence of interests between the city’s well-established black middle class and local 
(predominately white) business interests  - as he puts it, 
“Strategically important and co-optable black organizations and institutions were brought into the 
system of insider cooperation and negotiation, but they came in largely as clients of white 
patrons.” 
This, Stone contends, constrained the ability of city executives to effect truly progressive policies. This 
manifested in the form of lukewarm enforcement of school desegregation in the ‘60s, not unlike in 
Columbus – in both cases, city administration supported busing as an outward expression of their 
cosmopolitanism, but dared not pursue it to the extent that it would have incited tension and threatened 
the local investment climate. Instead, they pursued half-measures that assuaged popular fears on both 
Max Mauerman  29 
sides without effecting the actual racial composition of schools to a great degree. Similarly, Reed argues 
that Atlanta’s business development agenda became the “essential context” for the fulfillment of black 
political demands, constraining the mayor’s influence over key economic decisions like where to site the 
city’s massive Hartsfield-Jackson airport. Its ultimate location in Clayton County (the far south end of the 
city) was a symbolic concession to Atlanta's black community but meant little in terms of employment 
outcomes or access.  
Columbus has - on a smaller scale - faced the same tension between a progressive black administration 
and the established business community, resolved through the moderation of the mayor’s demands. 
However, while this tension may help explain certain recent incidents in the city’s development, it is not a 
sufficient explanation for its long-standing lack of investment in public transit. With the exception of the 
failed MORPC rail plan mentioned earlier, most of the obstacles to transit development in the city have 
come not from internal pressures but from external veto points: The authority of neighboring counties 
over planning and zoning (as discussed earlier), and the fiscal authority reserved by the state government.  
In the latter area, the city of Columbus is constrained in its ability to raise money for capital projects due 
to its lack of taxation options. Sales tax levies are the most expedient way for the city to fund projects, but 
these levies are subject to a referendum and are often time-limited. As COTA’s experience demonstrates, 
it is difficult for service provider to remain financially sustainable when funded predominately through 
levies.  
Unlike some states, Ohio allows its cities to collect their own income taxes as well. Columbus does not 
suffer from a lack of resources in this area – its incorporation of the surrounding suburbs (but without 
school integration, as mentioned) allowed it to avoid the worst consequences of the income tax drain that 
accompanied the “white flight” across US cities in the ‘70s. However, none of the city’s income tax goes 
toward funding COTA. (ODOT) The same is true of the city’s property tax. That said, Columbus is not 
unusual in this regard – nearly all of the largest cities in the US do not use income or property taxes to 
fund their public transit systems, due in large part to a desire to remain “competitive” by keeping taxes on 
residents low. We must look for fiscal variation elsewhere. 
To supplement conventional taxation options, some cities, like Dallas, Seattle and Portland, have funded 
public transit projects through a scheme known as “exactions” or “value capture” (Wise, 2010), in which 
cities offer land to developers on a financial condition – either direct payments to city government or in-
kind payments through infrastructure construction. Exactions are a favored fund-raising strategy for local 
governments, as they are more politically feasible than broad-based taxes and are directly tied to specific 
projects. 
However, exactions have faced challenges under Ohio law. There is nothing in the Ohio Revised Code 
specifically dealing with the subject, but a limited precedent has been established through several Ohio 
Supreme Court cases. On multiple occasions, the Court has ruled that exactions are permissible under 
“home rule” statutes if and only if they are used to directly fund developers’ public service costs - as in 
the case of water and sewer usage fees - and are no higher than the cost of service. (Johnson, 2008) This 
gives Ohio cities little ability to raise money for longer-term capital projects, like public transit. 
Columbus also faces strict limits and conditions on federal and state infrastructure funding, but this is the 
case for the vast majority of US cities, so it cannot explain why Columbus in particular has struggled to 
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develop a strong transit system. However, the state has influenced Columbus’s sprawl and uneven 
development in a less direct way: Corporate development incentives aimed at low-tax counties. For 
instance, Honda chose to open their first American manufacturing plant in Union County, a rural area 
adjacent to Columbus’s Franklin County, due to the influence of the state Department of Development. 
State officials negotiated the deal without any input from local authorities, and essentially dictated the tax 
terms on which the Union County commissioners were to accept the investment. (Personal 
correspondence, 2015) This unilateral approach to economic development accelerated the sprawl of the 
Columbus metropolitan region, and many social workers and nonprofits from the area have described lack 
of reliable transportation to jobs as one of the largest obstacles their low-income clients face. (Personal 
correspondence, 2015) 
In sum, the biggest contemporary problems with public transit projects in Columbus are a lack of 
revenue-raising options, insufficient popular and elite support, and confounding mandates from the state 
government. 
Conclusion 
It is difficult to single out one historical factor to explain Columbus’s underdevelopment of public transit, 
because in many ways the city has faced a “perfect storm” of confounding influences. Other cities had a 
lack of geographical constraints on expansion during their early history. Other cities (in fact, nearly all 
large cities in the US) adopted segregationist zoning laws in the early 20
th
 century. Other cities have faced 
financial and legal problems when attempting to raise money for public transit improvements. However, 
as the counterfactuals explored in my case study demonstrate, none of these factors on their own is 
sufficient to explain Columbus’s outcomes. Rather, the answer lies in their confluence: An early pattern 
of uneven, exclusionary growth has been solidified by modern laws that put institutional stumbling blocks 
in the way of the rezoning and local financing that transit improvement would require. A poor public 
transit system, in turn, discourages widespread ridership and ensures that middle-class voters and business 
elites come to see new transit proposals as a waste of money. 
In other words, uneven development and low public opinion of transit become a viscous cycle, enabled by 
certain legal institutions – namely, county/township veto power over development plans and state 
constraints on municipal fundraising. 
What generalizable lessons can be drawn from the case of Columbus? Given the highly decentralized 
nature of local governance in the US and the fact that my account rests heavily on the particular legal 
environment of Ohio, it may at first appear difficult to make any broader inferences. However, using the 
data from my quantitative analysis, I show that Columbus shares a number of relevant demographic 
characteristics with other low-accessibility cities – and that as a result, these cities likely share similar 
institutional obstacles to public transit development as well. What follows is a limited national analysis 
that would be a good starting point for future papers.  
I want to figure out if low-mobility cities like Columbus belong to a certain basic “type”; that is, if they 
share a certain combination of explanatory characteristics.  To determine this, I use factor analysis to 
calculate which orthogonal combinations of variables most effectively capture the variance of the data. 
Three main factors emerge (full output in appendix); these correspond roughly to the three basic types of 
cities that I describe below.  
Max Mauerman  31 
First, there are cities that have low income mobility, a large proportion of black residents, a high degree 
of racial segregation and low transit accessibility. These cities tend to be in the South, e.g. Atlanta, New 
Orleans, and Charlotte. Second, there are cities that have high income mobility, a relatively small black 
population and high transit accessibility. The large Pacific Northwest cities (ex. Portland and Seattle) fall 
into this type, as well as San Francisco. Third and finally, there are those that have moderate income 
mobility, a fairly large black population (but less than type 1), high segregation and high transit 
accessibility. Only a few of the largest cities, including New York and Chicago, fall into this type. (Factor 
3 in the output can be thought of as “correcting” the underlying pattern for these few cases.) 
The key to understanding Columbus (and most other cities in the Midwest) is that, in terms of this 
typology, it most closely resembles the “Sun Belt” cities of the South, not its post-industrial neighbors in 
the East. The similarities go beyond these demographic characteristics. Like the Sun Belt, Columbus did 
not develop in earnest until the mid-20
th
 century, and its ascent was due largely a skilled professional 
service sector (attracted by tax incentives), not a manufacturing base. This has left the type 1 cities with a 
distinct legacy of technocratic governance, in which distributional issues and identarian concerns are 
downplayed in favor of managerial expertise – the primary responsibilities of mayors are seen as bringing 
in developers and keeping the city's fiscal house in order.  
Likewise, the type 1 cities are marked by a significant degree of conflict with their state governments – 
they are solidly Democratic cities in the middle of red states, and historically they were not integral to 
their states' economies. As a result, the priorities of state and city government in type 1 cities often do not 
align. Finally, the type 1 cities also share a key geographic trait: they all had ample room to expand in 
their early years, aiding urban sprawl and highway-led growth.  
Taken together, these traits laid the conditions for a vicious cycle of highway-led growth and 
social/political fragmentation in the type 1 cities, as I explored for the case of Columbus. However, 
Columbus differs notably from the other type 1 cities in one significant respect: The size of its black 
population (only 12%, according to the 2000 Census). This is not a refutation of my thesis; rather, it 
demonstrates that the extent of structural racism is more than just a function of demographic numbers. 
Some comparative scholars of the welfare state believe that there is a direct link between the ethnic 
diversity of a polity and the weakness of its social support systems; however, as the case of Columbus 
shows, the reality is more complex.  
In Columbus, the mere possibility of a large black migrant influx in the early 20th century was enough to 
set off a wave of exclusionary zoning laws, even though the city did not attract nearly as many migrants 
(in absolute or proportional terms) as its neighbors Cleveland and Cincinnati. Indeed, the rhetorical 
strength of the (racially laden) urban/suburban divide is still strong today: I had multiple public officials 
from the wealthy suburb of Union County (including the County Commissioners) tell me they were 
reluctant to approve affordable housing construction or extended bus routes into their community because 
of the fear that these measures might attract the “riff-raff from Columbus”. (Personal correspondence, 
2015) Even if this supposed threat is much greater in reactionary voters' and politicians' minds than in 
reality, it still holds great influence over policy. 
The takeaways from the case of Columbus, then, are twofold: First, when it comes to large-scale 
development efforts, city governments are highly constrained by county- and state-level institutions. It is 
for this reason that the former mayor of Atlanta and longtime transit advocate Shirley Franklin has turned 
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her attention toward state-level action, such as heading the creation of a statewide transit authority (the 
GRTA) and planning to sue the state government for over-reliance on automobile transit under the Clean 
Air Act. (Personal correspondence, 2015) Second, the political weight of racial categories does 
necessarily correspond to their actual size; structural expressions of racism are always shaped and 
magnified by their larger institutional context. 
REFERENCES 
Ananat, E.O. (2011). The Wrong Side(s) of the Tracks: The Causal Effects of Racial Segregation on 
Urban Poverty and Inequality. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 3(2): 34-66 
Avent, R. (2011). The Gated City. E-book publication. 
Baum-Snow, N. (January 01, 2010). Changes in transportation infrastructure and commuting patterns in 
US metropolitan areas, 1960-2000. American Economic Review, 100, 2. 
Berube, A., Tomer, A., Kneebone, E. and Puentes, R. (2011). Missed Opportunity: Transit and Jobs in 
Metropolitan America. Brookings Institution Metropolitan Policy Program.  
Blanchard, F. I. (1922). An introduction to the economic and social geography of Columbus, Ohio. 
Blumenberg, E., & Manville, M. (January 01, 2004). Beyond the Spatial Mismatch: Welfare Recipients 
and Transportation Policy. Journal of Planning Literature, 19, 2, 182-205. 
Boschken, H. L. (2002). Social class, politics, and urban markets: The makings of bias in policy 
outcomes. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press. 
Boschken, H. L. (2002). Social class, politics, and urban markets: The makings of bias in policy 
outcomes. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
Boschmann, E. (November 01, 2011). Job access, location decision, and the working poor: A qualitative 
study in the Columbus, Ohio metropolitan area. Geoforum, 42, 6, 671-682. 
Brooks, L. (2014). Vestiges of Transit: Urban Persistence at a Micro Scale. Federal Reserve Board of 
Governors. Retrieved from http://www.econ.ucla.edu/alumniconf/Brooks.pdf 
Browning, R., & Reed, A. (1990). Racial politics in American cities. New York: Longman. 
Bryant, P. (1994, December 15). Putting the mass back in transit. Columbus Guardian. 
Max Mauerman  33 
Bryant, V. V. (1983). Columbus, Ohio and the great migration. 
Burgess, P. (1994). Planning for the private interest: Land use controls and residential patterns in 
Columbus, Ohio, 1900-1970. Columbus: Ohio State University Press. 
Bushway, S., Johnson, B., & Slocum, L. (January 01, 2007). Is the Magic Still There? The Use of the 
Heckman Two-Step Correction for Selection Bias in Criminology. Journal of Quantitative 
Criminology, 23, 2, 151-178. 
Chetty, R., Hendren, N., Kline, P., & Saez, E. (2014). Where is the Land of Opportunity? The Geography 
of Intergenerational Mobility in the United States. Quarterly Journal of Economics. 
Clark, Terry N. "The structure of community influence." People and Politics in Urban Society, ed. 
Harlan Hahn (" Urban Affairs Annual Reviews," Vol. 6(1972): 304-9. 
Columbus (Ohio). (1993). Columbus comprehensive plan. Columbus, Ohio: Development Dept., Planning 
Division. 
Freire, M., & Stren, R. (2001, January). The challenge of urban government: Policies and practices. 
Retrieved from http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2001/02/02/000094946_01
011905315240/Rendered/PDF/multi_page.pdf  
Gao, S., & Johnston, R. (2009). Public Versus Private Mobility for Low-Income Households. 
Transportation Research Record, 2125. 
Gibson, C. (2015, March). Columbus Rail Today. Retrieved from 
https://issuu.com/columbusrailtoday/docs/columbusrailtoday/1 
Handel, M. J. (2005). Worker skills and job requirements: Is there a mismatch?. Washington, D.C: 
Economic Policy Institute. 
Max Mauerman  34 
Harrison, B. & Hill, E.W. (1979). The Changing Structure of Jobs in Older and Younger Cities. Urban 
Publications. Paper 579. 
Hellerstein, J.K. & Neumark, D. & McInerney, M., (2008). Spatial mismatch or racial mismatch? Journal 
of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 464-479, September. 
Hunker, H. L. (2000). Columbus, Ohio: A personal geography. Columbus: Ohio State University Press. 
Jackson, K. (1985). Crabgrass frontier: The suburbanization of the United States. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Jacobs, G. S. (1998). Getting around Brown: Desegregation, development, and the Columbus public 
schools. Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press. 
Johnson, Jaye Pershing. "Uses of Fees or Alternatives to Fund Transit."TCRP Legal Research Digest 28 
(2008). 
Kasarda, J. (1993). Inner-City Concentrated Poverty and Neighborhood Distress: 1970 to 1990. Housing 
Policy Debate, 4(3), 253-302. 
Katz, L.F., Kling, J.R. and Liebman, J.B. (2001). Moving to Opportunity in Boston: Early Results of a 
Randomized Mobility Experiment. Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 116, No. 2, May, pp. 
607-54. 
Krueger, A. (2012). The Rise and Consequences for Inequality in the United States. Retrieved from 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/krueger_cap_speech_final_remarks.pdf 
Leigland, J. (1994). Public authorities and the determinants of their use by state and local 
governments. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 4(4), 521-544. 
Levinson, D. and Chen, W. (2005), Paving new ground: A markov chain model of the change in 
transportation networks and land use, in D. Levinson and K. Krizek, eds, ‘Access to 
Destinations’, Elsevier Publishers. 
Max Mauerman  35 
Lieberman, R. C. (1998). Shifting the color line: Race and the American welfare state. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press. 
Light Rail Now. (2007, May 6). 68% in poll back streetcar proposal. Retrieved from 
http://www.lightrailnow.org/news/n_newslog2007q2.htm#COL_20070506 
Lupo, A., Colcord, F. C., & Fowler, E. P. (1971). Rites of way: The politics of transportation in Boston 
and the U.S. city. Boston: Little, Brown. 
Mankiw, N. (2013). Defending the One Percent. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 21-34. 
Massey, D., & Denton, N. (1993). American apartheid: Segregation and the making of the underclass. 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 
Murphy, A. K. (2007), The Suburban Ghetto: The Legacy of Herbert Gans in Understanding the 
Experience of Poverty in Recently Impoverished American Suburbs. City & Community, 6: 21–
37 
Ohio Department of Transportation . Ohio Statewide Transit Needs Study. (2015, February). Retrieved 
from 
http://www.dot.state.oh.us/Divisions/Planning/Transit/TransitNeedsStudy/Documents/OhioSta
tewideTransitNeedsStudyFinalReport.pdf.  
Peters, A. H., and Fisher, P.S. (2002_. State Enterprise Zone Programs: Have They Worked? (Kalamazoo, 
MI: W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research). 
Putnam, R. (2000). Bowling alone: The collapse and revival of American community. New York: Simon 
& Schuster. 
Reed Jr, Adolph. "A critique of neo-progressivism in theorizing about local development policy: a case 
from Atlanta." The politics of urban development(1987): 199-215. 
Reed, K. (2013, August 2). The Truth About Income Mobility in Atlanta: Why the American Dream Is 
Alive in Our City. Huffington Post. 
Max Mauerman  36 
Saiz, A. (2010). The Geographic Determinants Of Housing Supply. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
1253-1296. 
Sanchez, T. (1999). The Connection Between Public Transit and Employment. Journal of the American 
Planning Association, 284-296. 
Small, M.L. and J. Feldman. Forthcoming. “Ethnographic Evidence, Heterogeneity, and Neighbourhood 
Effects after Moving to Opportunity.” In van Ham M., Manley D., Bailey N., Simpson L. & 
Maclennan D. (eds). Neighbourhood Effects Research: New Perspectives. Springer: Dordrecht. 
Stiglitz, J. (2012). The price of inequality: How today's divided society endangers our future. New York: 
W.W. Norton &. 
Stone, Clarence N. "Race and regime in Atlanta." Racial politics in American cities (1990): 125-139. 
Tolbert, C.M. and Sizer, M. (1996). U.S. Commuting Zones and Labor Market Areas: A 1990 update." 
Economic Research Service Staff Paper, 9614. 
United States., & Wise, D. (2010). Public transportation: Federal role in value capture strategies for 
transit is limited, but additional guidance could help clarify policies : report to congressional 
committees. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govt. Accountability Office. 
Wilson, W. (1987). The truly disadvantaged: The inner city, the underclass, and public policy. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Wolch, J. R., Pastor, M., & Dreier, P. (2004). Up against the sprawl: Public policy and the making of 
Southern California. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Yang, R., & Jargowsky, P. (June 01, 2006). Suburban Development and Economic Segregation in the 
1990s. Journal of Urban Affairs, 28, 3, 253-273. 
 
 
 
 
Max Mauerman  37 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix: Factor Analysis 
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    jobaccesslow    -0.0638    0.5676   -0.4654        0.4572  
     servfreqlow    -0.4565   -0.6382    0.2578        0.3178  
     coveragelow     0.0062    0.7123    0.1246        0.4771  
    subcty_~e_pc     0.1957    0.4342    0.2537        0.7088  
    hhinc_p~2007     0.4157    0.3910    0.3561        0.5475  
    frac_trav~15    -0.7476   -0.0330   -0.2118        0.3951  
    cs00_seg_~25     0.6856    0.2475   -0.1751        0.4380  
    cs_race~2000     0.6247   -0.0791   -0.0085        0.6035  
     cs_race_bla     0.6705   -0.5132   -0.1345        0.2689  
    e_rank_~8082    -0.5361    0.5744    0.0994        0.3728  
                                                               
        Variable    Factor1   Factor2   Factor3     Uniqueness 
                                                               
Factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances
    LR test: independent vs. saturated:  chi2(45) =  358.07 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000
                                                                              
       Factor10        -0.23454            .           -0.0478       1.0000
        Factor9        -0.19474      0.03980           -0.0397       1.0478
        Factor8        -0.17426      0.02048           -0.0355       1.0874
        Factor7        -0.07980      0.09446           -0.0162       1.1229
        Factor6        -0.07050      0.00930           -0.0144       1.1392
        Factor5         0.08046      0.15096            0.0164       1.1535
        Factor4         0.17084      0.09038            0.0348       1.1371
        Factor3         0.59331      0.42247            0.1208       1.1023
        Factor2         2.24019      1.64689            0.4562       0.9815
        Factor1         2.57973      0.33954            0.5253       0.5253
                                                                              
         Factor      Eigenvalue   Difference        Proportion   Cumulative
                                                                              
    Rotation: (unrotated)                          Number of params =       27
    Method: principal factors                      Retained factors =        3
Factor analysis/correlation                        Number of obs    =       91
